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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This essay examines big data analytics practices in light of Helen 
Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity paradigm. It critiques Paula Kift 
and Nissenbaum’s paper, Metadata in Context – An Ontological and 
Normative Analysis of the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection 
Program.1 It argues that while asserting that the NSA’s bulk 
surveillance program imposes a privacy violation – something that 
few if any commentators, even in the intelligence community dispute 
– the paper glosses over the critical next step in the analysis, assessing 
privacy costs against data benefits. Such cost benefit analysis 
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underlies existing privacy frameworks, including: the FTC’s unfairness 
doctrine; the European “legitimate interest of the controller” test; and 
Nissenbaum’s own contextual integrity analysis. This essay suggests 
that while previous scholarship and standard frameworks have 
focused on developing taxonomies and analyses of privacy harms, they 
have paid cursory attention to categorizing and weighing data 
rewards. An assessment of benefits is essential for a complete analysis 
of controversial data practices in both the government and business 
contexts.   
II.  BIG DATA – AND “METADATA IN CONTEXT” 
Big data continues to grate against existing techno-social norms. 
While even its most forceful advocates simultaneously caution against 
its risks,2 the expansion of big data collection and use remains 
relentless. Fueled both by speculative projections and by proven 
results, it has become commonplace to find data analysts in almost 
every organization, from retailers, manufacturers and hospitals to 
municipal and national governments, political and religious 
organizations, and policing and security services. Data scientists 
uncover trends and correlations that could not have been identified 
without advances in computing power and the accumulation of 
previously unfathomable quantities of data.  
Big data threatens to undo the Fair Information Principles, which 
have long defined privacy law and best practices.3 While in the past, 
privacy protections revolved around providing individuals with notice 
of a data practice and the choice to opt in or out, it has now become 
increasingly difficult to predict and disclose how personal information 
will be used. Not only do many data analytic techniques eschew the 
hypothesis testing model of the analog world, but the rise of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning has made it virtually impossible to 
predefine the trajectory of data analysis.4 Big data, therefore, calls for 
 
 
 
 
2 ALEC ROSS, THE INDUSTRIES OF THE FUTURE 152 (2016). 
3 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 239 (2013); Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The 
End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 74 (2013); EXEC. OFF. OF 
THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES (2014), 
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo64868/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8C5N-P65U].  
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a new framework for analyzing the privacy implications of data 
practices. 
Helen Nissenbaum’s seminal book, Privacy in Context,5 took on 
this challenge. In it, Nissenbaum argued that information privacy is 
fundamentally contextual. Privacy depends on an individual’s 
reasonable assumptions about the social context in which information 
will be used. An individual will feel aggrieved if her information is 
used in a manner that violates her reasonable expectations. As 
shorthand, Nissenbaum defined this as a right to “contextual 
integrity.” 
This essay presents big data from the point of view of contextual 
integrity. As Paula Kift and Nissenbaum demonstrate in Metadata in 
Context, contextual integrity is extremely effective at identifying when 
a new practice will impact privacy. The framework, however, provides 
little guidance on when a practice may nonetheless be justified in spite 
of its impact on contextual integrity. By its very nature, big data often 
presumes an impact on the contextual integrity of an information flow 
to gain new data insights. The legitimacy of data analytics will thus 
depend on whether the benefits of a new practice outweigh its risks. 
Alas, without the tools for assessing data benefits, privacy protections 
may be eroded by false data promises just as technological progress 
may be squandered by undervaluing potential gains. 
III.  UNPACKING CONTEXTUAL VIOLATIONS 
Contextual integrity is a two-step analysis. First, a reviewer must 
assess the effect of a new practice on the actors, attributes, and 
transmission principles involved in an information flow. If these 
factors are not altered, then the information practice passes the test. 
If, however, the practice alters any of these factors, then there is a 
“prima facie violation” and the analysis proceeds to the second step. 
With this second step, contextual analysis “requires an evaluation of 
the moral and political factors affected by the [new practice] and 
whether or not the benefits of altering information flows in this way 
                                                                                                                   
4 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, PREPARING 
FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/os
tp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TFB-DBMV]. 
5 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE (2009). 
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justifies potential costs in light of contextually specific goals and 
ends.”6 In other words, contextual integrity calls for cost-benefit 
analysis where a new practice imposes a privacy risk. 
In Metadata in Context, Kift and Nissenbaum deploy this 
framework to examine the NSA’s telephony metadata collection 
program. Using contextual integrity, the authors challenge existing 
legal doctrines that have shielded metadata collection from 
constitutional scrutiny. Namely, the authors question the distinctions 
between content and non-content, private information and business 
records, and concealed versus plainly visible information, arguing that 
these tropes fail to account for material technological changes that 
have changed the context of metadata collection over the past two 
decades as information technology has become ubiquitous. 
Under their analysis, the metadata program altered the 
transmission principles of information flows because subscribers did 
not knowingly or voluntarily share metadata with the government. It 
also altered the attributes of metadata because, by aggregating 
metadata and applying data analytics to it, the NSA could glean from 
the resulting mosaic insights that could not be identified from any 
single tile. Finally, while subscribers may have expected telephone 
service providers to have access to metadata, by sharing the data with 
the government, these companies expanded the range of actors 
involved in the information flow. 
To be sure, not all big data analytics will violate this first step of 
the contextual integrity test. But, many practices will because, at its 
zenith, big data analytics relies on acquiring unforeseen insights from 
an ever expanding pool of data sources. The transmission principles, 
attributes and actors involved in an information flow are susceptible 
to change without notice as information is collected, repackaged and 
shared in novel ways. Big data analytics breaks contextual integrity 
almost by definition. 
By relying on social expectations, this first step of contextual 
integrity is vulnerable to evolving attitudes and understandings about 
data protection. As big data becomes the new norm, there is a risk that 
privacy protections are eroded with acquiescence of contextual 
integrity. In other words, if individuals come to expect unexpected 
data practices, privacy protections will be lost. A similar vulnerability 
afflicts constitutional Fourth Amendment protection under the Katz v. 
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United States decision.7 Katz established a two-part test to measure 
whether a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” including 
a subjective prong, checking whether “a person [has] exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy[,]” and an objective prong, 
verifying whether “the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”8 In setting the dials of constitutional 
protection to the tune of societal expectations, Katz created a self-
fulfilling prophecy where the less privacy (or more surveillance) 
individuals expect, the less constitutional protection they are entitled 
to.9  
In Metadata in Context, Kift and Nissenbaum deftly overcome this 
challenge by focusing on the voluntariness of one’s participation in a 
data practice, rather than knowledge of it. In the case of NSA 
metadata collection, since the social costs of opting out of electronic 
communications are so high – subscribers have neither a reasonable 
alternative to using their devices nor any control over the metadata 
that those devices create in the course of their operation – they do not 
voluntarily share the metadata. And even to the extent that 
subscribers are aware of the metadata they share, they cannot 
reasonably predict the type of inferences that the government may be 
able to draw from the data using secretive analytic techniques. 
Moreover, the government’s vast capabilities of aggregation and 
analysis fundamentally alter the nature of the information, from 
discrete points of metadata to a rich tapestry from which the 
government can draw consequential inferences. 
The same holds true for many private sector data practices. The 
fact that an individual might expect that data will be collected and 
used in any number of ways does not mean that the individual has a 
deep enough understanding of the practice to fully accept it. Indeed, 
as a study by Turow, Hennessy and Draper revealed, the more 
individuals know about what marketers do with their personal 
information, the more likely they were to feel resigned about sharing it 
and to resist rational decision-making with regard to privacy trade-
 
 
 
 
7 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
8 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
9 See, e.g., Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 1433 (2008).  
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offs.10 Thus, just like for the NSA’s metadata program, the legitimacy 
of data analytics frequently will turn on the second step of contextual 
integrity: cost-benefit analysis. 
IV. THE CRITICAL SECOND STEP 
The contextual integrity test “presumptively favors protecting the 
integrity of entrenched informational norms.”11 The result is that the 
second step of the analysis plays the role of gatekeeper for new data 
practices, legitimizing only those practices that can demonstrate an 
overriding benefit. This represents a marked departure from Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, which helps explain why contextual integrity 
results in a more rigorous analysis of metadata collection than that 
seen in some legal challenges.  
Under the Fourth Amendment, a court must first ask whether a 
search intrudes upon a constitutionally protected “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” before deciding whether a search was 
reasonable. For litigants, that first step – proving that there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy – often is the critical juncture. The 
first step of the analysis can excuse surveillance practices from 
constitutional scrutiny altogether. Most notably, as a result of the 
“third party doctrine,” whole classes of digital surveillance have been 
excluded from Fourth Amendment analysis. Once a practice is found 
to constitute a “search,” however, clear parameters exist for 
determining whether the practice is nonetheless “reasonable.” In most 
situations, reasonableness is defined by the presence of warrant, 
based on probable cause, to validate search. Only in rare 
circumstances, where, for example, there is an exigency or some other 
overriding concern, will a search be valid in the absence of a warrant. 
With contextual integrity, more practices will proceed to the 
second level of analysis, but Kift and Nissenbaum offer few clues as to 
how reasonableness would then be determined. Instead, they note 
merely that a presumptive contextual violation can be overcome only 
if new practices are demonstrably ‘more effective at achieving 
 
 
 
 
10 JOSEPH TUROW, MICHAEL HENNESSY & NORA DRAPER, THE TRADEOFF FALLACY: HOW 
MARKETERS ARE MISREPRESENTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS AND OPENING THEM UP TO 
EXPLOITATION (2015), 
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TN3G-FKYQ]. 
11 Kift & Nissenbaum, supra note 1, at 367. 
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[contextual] values, ends, and purposes[,]” or the equivalent.12 The 
absence of defined terms for the analysis becomes evident when the 
authors move to assess the costs and benefits of the NSA’s metadata 
program. According to the authors, the metadata program fails this 
second step. They point to the high financial costs of the program and 
the fact that it diverts resources from “traditional and targeted 
surveillance [techniques].”13 More importantly, the NSA program 
inflicted material impacts on “civil liberties such as privacy, freedom 
of speech and association, transparency, due process and the balance 
of power between the government and its citizens.”14  
Against these impacts, Kift and Nissenbaum suggest that the NSA 
program’s benefits were flimsy. While they note that intelligence 
representatives claimed that the metadata program thwarted more 
than fifty different terrorist attacks, they cite a report from the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board finding “only [one] case in which 
the bulk collection of telephony metadata played a significant role in 
the containment of terrorist activity.”15 Even this one case, the authors 
argue, is unconvincing.  
Yet even as they criticize the intelligence community, Kift and 
Nissenbaum also weaken their own analysis. For it is obvious that 
under any cost-benefit analysis, zero benefits are outweighed by 
legitimate privacy concerns. But how does this arithmetic work if the 
benefits are non-trivial? For example, had the NSA’s claim to have 
thwarted fifty attacks stood up, would that have justified the 
widespread privacy intrusion? And what if the NSA’s program 
successfully prevented a single high-magnitude terrorist event? What 
about just one death of a child? Or a single death of an old man? 
Metadata in Context gives no guidance.  
The authors also note that while the September 11 attacks 
provided the impetus for the program, the intelligence community 
failed to prevent the attacks “not because of insufficient information 
collection but because the FBI and NSA had an insufficient 
understanding of the rules that governed information sharing 
between intelligence agencies – information they already had thanks 
 
 
 
 
12 NISSENBAUM, supra note 5, at 180. 
13 Kift & Nissenbaum, supra note 1, at 370. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 369. 
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to conventional law enforcement techniques.”16 Ostensibly, by sharing 
existing data, the authors argue the intelligence community could 
have better achieved its goals with less intrusion upon privacy.  
Yet it is not clear how this would square with Kift and 
Nissenbaum’s model for contextual integrity. The number of 
individuals affected by an information practice is not a factor in 
contextual analysis. One of the theory’s central insights, in fact, is that 
sharing or repurposing information may impact privacy as much as 
collection in the first place. Indeed, in some cases, mass, automated 
monitoring may have less impact on privacy than specific, targeted 
surveillance.17 For example, when an intelligence agency zeroes in on 
an individual target, sharing that person’s information among other 
agencies could lead to tangible harms, like being placed on no-fly list, 
being audited by the IRS, or, in an extreme scenario, being targeted by 
a drone strike.18  
This may be a slip, for the authors’ analysis appears to fit more 
closely with traditional privacy metrics that emphasize collection than 
it does with contextual integrity’s focus on information use. It reveals, 
however, the absence of tools at the authors’ disposal for rigorously 
assessing costs, and in particular, benefits, at the analytical step 
requiring cost-benefit analysis. In a contextual analysis of big data, 
too, we are bound to reach an equivalent stumbling block.   
V. THE NEED FOR DATA BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Cost benefit analysis in privacy law is not unique to the second 
step of contextual integrity. Existing legal frameworks and 
organizational practices recognize the need to balance privacy risks 
against data benefits. These frameworks already provide detailed 
guidance on the many flavors of privacy risk. However, risks are only 
one part of the cost-benefit equation. To understand whether a data 
 
 
 
 
16 Id. at 368. 
17 Omer Tene, A New Harm Matrix for Cybersecurity Surveillance, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 
391, 401 (2014). 
18 See Christian Grothoff & J. M. Porup, The NSA’s SKYNET Program May Be Killing 
Thousands of Innocent People, ARS TECHNICA UK (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://arstechnica.co.uk/security/2016/02/the-nsas-skynet-program-may-be-killing-
thousands-of-innocent-people/ [https://perma.cc/LLA7-38JF]. 
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practice is valid in light of contextual violations, decision-makers must 
also dissect, prioritize and quantify data benefits.  
The need for data benefits analysis is evident in the FTC’s use of its 
unfairness authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act. To find that an 
act or practice is unfair, the FTC must prove that “the act or practice 
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is 
not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.” Under this balancing test, the FTC has tried to articulate 
the contours of privacy harms, dissecting both the probability of 
privacy risks and the magnitude of potential harms in a line of 
enforcement cases.19 But aside from broadly recognizing that “big data 
analytics can provide numerous opportunities for improvements in 
society,”20 the agency has produced little guidance on how to quantify 
data benefits and assess them against corresponding risks. 
This may explain why the FTC has scarcely used its unfairness 
authority (independently of a deception claim) to pursue violations 
other than a company’s failure to implement appropriate data security 
practices.21 In data security cases, the balancing test is simplified 
because inadequate security typically provides consumers with no 
discernible benefits. Any harm to consumers will easily outweigh the 
nonexistent benefits. Without some way of quantifying benefits, 
however, the agency may find it more difficult to act on practices that 
provide more than trivial benefits – a smartphone flashlight 
application22 or more targeted ads.23 This hamstrings the FTC’s ability 
 
 
 
 
19 See, e.g., Opinion of the Commission, LabMD, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 9357 (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160729labmd-opinion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7NX2-TL8Q] ("This reading is supported by prior Commission cases 
applying the unfairness standard, which also teach that the likelihood that harm will occur 
must be evaluated together with the severity or magnitude of the harm involved.").  
20 FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-
exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4WF-BFGP].  
21 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 594 (2014). 
22 Decision and Order, Goldenshores Technologies, LLC, F.T.C. Docket No. C-4446 (2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140409goldenshoresdo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H5W5-4F2F].  
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to use its unfairness authority in privacy cases, even as the complexity 
of data flows makes it more difficult to rely purely on consumer 
deception.24 
The FTC’s reliance on cost benefit analysis is likely to become 
more pronounced under the Trump administration. FTC 
Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen called for renewed emphasis on 
cost benefit and economic analysis in one of her first speeches after 
taking on the role of acting chairman in 2017.25 Under this view of 
Section 5, the FTC would have to analyze “more rigorously what 
constitutes ‘substantial injury’ in the context of information about 
consumers.”26 This, in turn, will give more importance to the FTC’s 
Bureau of Economics (“BE”), which is tasked with analyzing the 
economic impact of consumer protection and competition 
investigations and rulemakings. One study found that BE’s analysis in 
privacy cases has been limited by the difficulty of “assigning a dollar 
value to a privacy violation,” on the one hand, and assessing the value 
of privacy regulation on the other.27 The challenges of effective cost 
benefit have pushed the Commission to pursue enforcement under its 
deception authority, even where unfairness would fit more closely 
with the perceived violation. 
Likewise, current privacy impact assessment (PIA) frameworks 
provide little insight into balancing impacts with the promises of new 
technologies. This led the National Institute for Standards and 
                                                                                                                   
23 Decision and Order, Sears Holdings Management Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4264 
(2009), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2009/09/090604searsdo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/79DX-G862].  
24 CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016). 
25 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Opening Keynote at the ABA 2017 Consumer Protection 
Conference (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1069803/mko_aba_con
sumer_protection_conference.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AR8-BL5M]. 
26 Concurring Statement of Acting Chairman Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Vizio, Inc., F.T.C. 
Docket No. 1623024 (2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1070773/vizio_concurri
ng_statement_of_chairman_ohlhausen_2-6-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SBG-P32K]. 
27 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The Federal Trade Commission’s Inner Privacy Struggle, THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY WELFARE (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2901526 [https://perma.cc/CY2H-
6CF7]. 
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Technology (NIST) to call for “additional tools that facilitate 
repeatable and measurable methods for identifying, prioritizing, and 
mitigating privacy problems.”28 In its final report on privacy 
engineering and risk management, NIST made significant strides at 
identifying privacy risks “that extend beyond unauthorized access to 
PII.”29 For example, in the context of big data, the NIST framework 
highlighted the risk of “unintended bias or discrimination in systems 
that determine eligibility for goods, services, and employment 
opportunities,” as well as the chilling effect that “unanticipated 
revelations about individuals and their online connections and 
communities” could have on free speech.30 Critically, however, while 
NIST found that “[c]ontext . . . is the foundation for the interpretative 
analysis necessary to understanding when a privacy boundary line has 
been crossed,” the NIST framework provides no clues as to how to 
build on this foundation.31 There is no discussion of data benefits or to 
cost-benefit analysis, outside of vague references to an “acceptable 
level of risk.”32  
This leaves organizations without the necessary guidance at the 
crucial stage, after the PIA, in which they must determine whether 
and how to proceed. For example, while discussing low-
likelihood/high-impact activities and high-likelihood/low-impact 
activities, the draft NIST framework recommended “mitigation” and 
“controls” respectively to reduce the risk.33 But not all risks can be 
mitigated or controlled. And, in some cases, even known and 
unavoidable harms may be justified. For example, Facebook’s decision 
to implement the “News Feed” feature led to a “storm of protest” 
 
 
 
 
28 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY RISK MANAGEMENT 
FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INTERNAL REPORT DRAFT 8062 (2015), 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-8062/nistir_8062_draft.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EJ6Z-7RAP]. 
29 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., DEPT. OF COMMERCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PRIVACY ENGINEERING AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS, NISTIR 8062 (2017), 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D6N-
58KA]. 
30 Id. at 39-40. 
31 Id. at 23. 
32 Id. at 13. 
33 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 28, at 23-24. 
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because it altered the context of social interactions, but ultimately it 
became the company’s most popular feature.34 Or, more importantly, 
big data analysis could conceivably help find a cure for a terminal 
disease or expedite disaster recovery efforts in an area struck by an 
epidemic, justifying a higher degree of privacy risk than data practices 
geared simply at improving ad targeting return on investment.  
European data protection law provides a helpful lens for 
examining cost-benefit questions through the “legitimate interests” 
clause,35 which will remain part of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) when it comes into effect in 2018.36 In a nod to 
contextual integrity, analyzing a controller’s legitimate interests under 
the GDPR requires “consideration [of] the reasonable expectations of 
data subjects based on their relationship with the controller,” 
including “whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time 
and in the context of the collection of the personal data that 
processing for that purpose may take place.”37 
Unlike contextual integrity, however, legitimate interests start 
with an analysis of organizational interest, and only if there is a 
sufficient interest does the analysis proceed to examine whether that 
interest is “overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the data subject.”38 In exploring the application of this 
test, the Article 29 Working Party found that the concept of “interest” 
is broader than a “purpose,” encompassing benefits not just derived 
by the controller, but also by society at large. Nonetheless, “interests 
that are too vague or speculative will not be sufficient.”39  
The fact that benefits are uncertain, however, should not block a 
project in all cases. Look at President Obama’s billion-dollar pledge to 
cure cancer, which appears likely to survive into the Trump presidency 
 
 
 
 
34 NISSENBAUM, supra note 5, at 62. 
35 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 7(f), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 40, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF 
[https://perma.cc/FX4C-DDSU].  
36 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36. 
37 Id. at (L119) 9. 
38 Id. at (L 199) 36. 
39 Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 
7 of Directive 95/46/EC ["Legitimate Interests Opinion"], ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION 
WORKING PARTY (2014). 
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– a goal at once improbable and yet so noble, it was named the 
“Cancer Moonshot.”40 Innovation – indeed, business more generally – 
inevitably requires taking chances. Any assessment of data benefits 
should allow for some uncertain benefits, while also weeding out those 
that are too improbable. Just as privacy costs are measured in risk of 
harm, so too must data benefit analysis include consideration of the 
chance of a data benefit. Polonetsky, Tene, and Jerome account for 
uncertain benefits in their framework for data benefits analysis by 
discounting the magnitude of a potential benefit against its likelihood 
of occurring, as risk analysis does for the risk of harms.41  
Ultimately, however, the costs and benefits of any new practice fall 
differently upon individuals, communities, organizations, and society 
at large. The difference between justifiable risks and irresponsible 
risks depends not only on the odds of success and the magnitude of 
the wager, but also on who stands to win and who stands to lose. 
While it seems logical to ensure that the risk-bearer and beneficiary 
are one and the same, such a result is neither always possible nor 
desirable. For example, it may be necessary, and indeed courts have 
agreed, to mandate vaccination programs that benefit society at large, 
even while they impose costs on the few who object.42 
As in many other legal contexts, these complex ethical issues 
necessarily raise the question of the burden of proof and who the 
decision maker should be.43 The European system places its thumb on 
the scale in favor of individuals and legislatures. Individuals because 
an organization’s legitimate interests may be overridden by those of 
the data subject, even if they are not necessarily legitimate.44 Only 
 
 
 
 
40 Kim Smuga-Otto, Will Biden's Cancer Moonshot Survive the Trump Administration?, 
DISCOVER MAGAZINE D-BRIEF BLOG (Feb. 2, 2017), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/d-
brief/2017/02/02/cancer-moonshot-trump-administration/#.WMGoW9LyhaQ 
[https://perma.cc/W9B7-HWNV]. 
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“compelling” legitimate interests will overcome an individual’s 
objection.45 This highlights the privileged role of legislators in this 
system as one way, and in practice, perhaps the only way, to 
demonstrate an interest is compelling is to point to a legislated policy 
objective. Thus, while legitimate interest analysis makes strides at 
evaluating privacy costs and benefits, ultimately it shies away at the 
critical moment, leaving it to the data subject or the legislature to 
make this assessment.  
And yet the emerging dataverse, with its seamless, constant data 
flows, requires a broader circle of ethical decision-makers. Some 
decisions should be made only by those who will be affected. In other 
cases, it will be impossible to capture user consent in all the myriad 
ways that data is being collected and used, both online and in physical 
spaces such as smart cities or homes. While legislation may 
accommodate all the diverse interests of stakeholders affected by data 
decisions, legislatures simply cannot move quickly enough to meet 
changing technology, nor should they be expected to guide every data 
decision that occurs in any organization.  
By identifying when a practice mismatches those who bear the risk 
and those who stand to benefit, data benefit analysis will facilitate 
selecting a decision-maker appropriate to the task. For some 
decisions, the ethical considerations and value judgments will require 
input from experts and ethical review committees.46 Other data 
decisions, however, may be justified only by those who bear the risk.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Metadata in Context, Kift and Nissenbaum examined the NSA’s 
metadata program in light of contextual integrity. This essay 
employed the framework to analyze big data practices, finding that 
new data practices, by definition, will alter informational context. 
Thus, for big data, the question is not whether there is a contextual 
violation, but rather, when is such a violation justified. Contextual 
integrity leaves open this question – the “second step” – to cost-
benefit analysis, but it offers little guidance on how to tally data 
benefits. This problem arises not just with contextual integrity, but 
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also with other frameworks, like the FTC’s unfairness doctrine or 
Europe’s legitimate interests test, that promote the assessment of 
inconsistently defined privacy risks against vaguely articulated data 
benefits. 
Information privacy has reached a critical juncture. Aided by the 
work of Nissenbaum and others, the public is increasingly attuned to 
privacy risks inherent in new technologies. With the context of 
information flows constantly changing, it is time to focus on the next 
step, cost benefit analysis.47 
 
 
 
 
 
47 See FUTURE OF PRIVACY F. & PROGRAM ON ECON. & PRIVACY AT GEORGE MASON U. 
ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH., CALL FOR PAPERS – DEVELOPING A BENEFIT-COST FRAMEWORK FOR 
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